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Collectivism is a set of ideas, principles and approaches that begin from the recognition of the 
collective aspects of social life.  Where individualism views actions, decisions and policies 
from the perspective of independent, single actors, collectivism focuses on social groups, 
communities and the wider society.   
  In Reclaiming Individualism, I made a case for social and government action in order 
to protect and enhance the conditions of individuals.1 The argument of that book was based 
on a distinctive analytical framework, outlining three discrete approaches to individualism: 
moral, methodological and substantive. Substantive individualism is based in the belief that 
all actions are the actions of individuals, and that every social or political action is taken by 
individual human beings.  Methodological individualism reviews economic, social and 
political arguments as if they are based in the decisions of people one by one; the actions of 
groups are understood as a whole series of individual actions, added together.  (This is the 
characteristic approach of economic theory.)  The case for methodological individualism has 
been argued with some force, but whether it applies depends on circumstances; sometimes it 
works, sometimes it does not.  The most compelling arguments for individualism are moral.   
As a moral position, individualism is built around the defence of each and every person: 
individuals have rights, and every person matters.  There is a very strong case to emphasise 
the role of individualism in the protection of individual dignity, rights and the value of every 
human being. 
In the consideration of collectivism, by contrast, the strongest arguments for a 
collective approach are substantive, and that is where this book begins.  Substantive 
collectivism is the idea that we live, not as ‘individuals’, but as the members of social groups, 
like families, neighbourhoods and communities, and that many of our actions are done 
together with others in organisations, such as schools and businesses, and social institutions.  
People are what they are, and who they are, because they live and have relationships with 
other people.  Families, households, communities, organisations and nations can all be treated 
as social units, which have interests, concerns and priorities that might be different from the 
individuals who make them up.   
                                                 
1 P Spicker, 2013, Reclaiming individualism, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Methodological collectivism looks for explanations and patterns of behaviour not in 
the actions of individual human beings, but in the actions of groups - including classes, ethnic 
groups and societies taken as a whole.  This is the characteristic approach of sociology; it also 
has an important pragmatic purpose in the development of public policy.   
Moral collectivism begins from the premise that collective social groups - families, 
businesses, institutions, governments and countries - are moral agents; that they have rights 
and responsibilities, that groups as well as individuals can take moral action, and that the 
morality of their actions can sensibly be assessed in those terms. Collective groups bind 
people to each other in networks that govern their interactions with each other, mutual 
responsibility and social roles.    
Collectivism is not a single idea, or a unified doctrine, any more than individualism is.  
These are perspectives, not ideologies.  They lead to different interpretations of social, moral 
and political issues; they suggest various approaches to problems; they emphasise alternative 
values.  They might well underpin some systems of belief, but they are not systems of belief 
in their own right.  It makes more sense to see them as ways of thinking.  This book begins 
from a dualist position: it is perfectly possible to be individualist in relation to some issues 
and collectivist about others.  But collectivism is based on the perspective of groups of 
people, rather than individuals, and it is only from the perspective of the group that it can be 
adequately understood. 
    






We are social animals; we live with other people.  Everyone, or nearly everyone, is born into 
a family and soon enmeshed in a set of relationships.  The vast majority of people are born 
into some kind of community, where people severally come repeatedly into contact with each 
other, have obligations and relationships to each other, recognise each other as belonging to 
distinct social groups, such as families, neighbourhoods or nationalities.  Little or nothing 
about us is unaffected by other human beings - social contact is our natural state.  Life is full 
of situations where we know there are codes, norms, rules and expectations of behaviour.  
The lines may get blurred at times, but the things that one does in a supermarket are not the 
ways that people behave in a school classroom; the way that a person behaves in a music 
concert is not how the very same person behaves at work.  Our behaviour is ‘socialised’.  We 
may put the differences down to social behaviour, but in a sense all our behaviour is social: 
we do personal and private things, like sleeping, eating or dressing, in ways we have learned 
to do them.   
The idea of the ‘social’ refers, in general terms, to the substantial range of norms, 
expectations, influences that people are subject to as part of the condition of living with and 
around other people.  Watkins, a committed individualist, suggests that this is all subjective: 
 
“Whereas physical things can exist unperceived, social ‘things’ like laws, prices, 
prime ministers ... are created by personal attitudes.  ... If social objects are formed by 
individual attitudes, an explanation of their formation must be an individualistic 
explanation.”2 
 
There is a case for saying that social phenomena are ‘inter-subjective’3 – that they are 
constructed from shared views and conventions, formed over time by groups of people.  
There is none for saying that they are ‘created by personal attitudes’, as if the money in your 
bank account or the laws about speeding will change if only you furrow your eyebrows and 
think about them differently.  Social ‘things’ - societal facts - have an existence distinct from 
the mind-set of any individual.4 Laws and prices are established by common convention and 
understanding, but they are not less meaningful for that - any more than other intangibles, 
like language, finance or history.  Family relationships, banking, employment and education 
are not the product of individual imaginations; they are part of the fabric of everyday life.  
Collectivism is sometimes conflated with ‘holism’, a view that everything we do is 
shaped by society.5  For Agassi, ‘collectivism or holism’ is ‘The doctrine that individual ends 
and decisions are created by social forces; thus they are constrained by social constraints and 
                                                 
2 J Watkins, 1953, Ideal types and historical explanation, in A Ryan (ed), The philosophy of 
social explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1973.   
3 P Berger, T Luckmann, 1967, The social construction of reality, Anchor, New York. 
4 M Mandelbaum, 1955, Societal facts, British Journal of Sociology 6 305-17. 
5 J Watkins, 1957, Historical explanation in the social sciences, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 8(30) 104-117 
subject to conformity with the good of society at large.’6 Collectivism is much broader and 
looser than that, but holism is an important position in its own right.  It  has been described as 
the idea that ‘macrosocial phenomena have primacy over individuals in explaining behaviour 
and cannot be redefined in terms of individual behaviour’.7  Social constructs may 
‘supervene’ on individual behaviour, shaping the circumstances in which those individuals 
operate; individuals have to adapt or adjust to those social circumstances.8  Durkheim 
explained that language, obligations, moral rules, financial reality and so forth constrain 
individual choices: 
 
“these types of behaviour ... are endued with a compelling and coercive power by 
virtue of which, whether he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him.  ... 
Even when in fact I can struggle free from these rules and successfully break them, it 
is never without being forced to fight against them.  ... most of our ideas and 
tendencies are not developed by ourselves, but come to us from outside, they can only 
penetrate us by imposing themselves upon us.”9 
 
That does not mean - as some of the critics of this view would have it10 - that no decision is 
individual, or that people have no agency or capacity to act for themselves.  Pettit, for 
example, complains of Durkheim’s holism that ‘intentional agency is an illusion, at least in 
those areas where social-structural regularities rule.’11 Durkheim does not say that: he says 
that countering social influences is difficult, which is not at all the same thing.  There are two 
principles here, individual agency and social influence; there really should be no difficulty 
about accepting both of them at the same time.  The philosopher Gilbert Ryle, writing about 
free will and determinism, argued that there was no inconsistency in holding that there are 
rules, even quite restrictive ones, at the same time as asserting that people have choices as to 
what to do with them – his examples include the game of chess, and the rules of English 
grammar.12 Mathematics, too, has firm, rather inflexible rules (except, perhaps, in 
Australia13), but anyone who imagines that there is no scope in mathematics for creativity, 
originality or individuality hasn’t grasped what’s going on.14 Society, whose rules are 
somewhat easier to bend or break, offers much greater scope for diversity. 
Durkheim’s work excited passionate opposition in its day.   
 
“It is true that this word 'constraint' ... is in danger of infuriating those who zealously 
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11 Pettit, 1993, p 132. 
12 G Ryle, 1963, The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p 77. 
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australian-pm/, last obtained 28th September 2018 
14 G Hardy (1940) A mathematician’s apology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. 
uphold out-and-out individualism.  Since they maintain that the individual is 
completely autonomous, it seems to them that he is diminished every time he is made 
aware that he is not dependent on himself alone.”15 
 
There are still individualists who argue that all social and group action must be interpreted in 
terms of the behaviour of individuals.  The argument was forcefully made by Hayek16 or 
Watkins.17 Popper wrote that: 
 
“the ‘behaviour’ and the ‘actions’ of collectives, such as states or social groups, must 
be reduced to the behaviour and actions of human individuals ... we should never be 
satisfied with an explanation in terms of so-called ‘collectives’.”18 
 
Popper’s argument was more of a moral protest than an analysis of society.  These writers 
were all working in the period shortly after a major European war, and they had strong 
reasons for holding people personally responsible for the outrages of that war.  The 
circumstances of the same war, however, give the lie to the claim that everything is reducible 
to the level of the individual.  My father and my grandparents had to escape from France, but 
it was France that was invaded, not my family.  The countries of Europe are not just a bunch 
of individual human beings who happen to live in a geographical area.  They are collective 
groups with definable legal, political and social characteristics.  During my lifetime, the 
United Kingdom has engaged in a series of armed conflicts around the world, principally a 
reflection of a complex network of international agreements and alliances.  A focus on 





Thinking about society as a whole is not necessarily the best way to make sense of social life.  
A society is a collective, but it is made up of lots of smaller collectives.  People live and 
relate to each other in groups.  Groups, Brown writes,  
 
“are an inescapable part of human existence.  Like them or not, they simply are not 
going to go away.  People grow up in groups, sometimes called families; they work in 
groups, as engine crews, design teams or hunting parties; they learn in groups; they 
play in groups, in a multitude of team games; they make decisions in groups, whether 
these be government committees, village councils or courtroom juries; and of course, 
they also fight in groups, as street gangs, revolutionary cadres and national armies.  In 
short, human beings are group beings.”19  
 
Social groups have three core characteristics.  First, they have an identity - they are 
recognisable as a group.  For many groups, even if individuals in the group change, some 
                                                 
15 Durkheim, 1901, p 52. 
16 F Hayek, 1948, Individualism and economic order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
17 J Watkins, 1957, Historical explanation in the social sciences, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 8(30) 104-117 
18 K Popper, 1945, The open society and its enemies, vol 2, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul pp 87, 91 
19 R Brown, 2000, Group processes, Oxford: Blackwell, p xv. 
people leave or others join, the group will still be there.  Groups can be formal or informal.  
We come into contact with formal groups all the time - schools, hospitals, supermarket 
chains, telephone companies, businesses, universities and so on.  In this kind of organisation, 
it is relatively straightforward to recognise people in terms of their role or position in the 
group - an employee, an official, a teacher, and so on.  The position of informal groups is less 
clear.  Families have a clear identity: ad hoc groups of friends probably do not, and nor do 
people who happen to be doing similar things, like hospital patients in a waiting room, or 
audiences.  Goffman argues that we can identify and recognise all kinds of informal 
collective or ‘teams’.20 We can tell the difference, he suggests, between people walking 
together on the street, and those who are just walking in the same direction; there are little 
clues, tells and elements of ‘performance’.21 These are part of everyday interaction - it is 
possible on the same basis to distinguish categories of individuals who are not part of a 
group, such as commuters and tourists.  But being members of a social group implies 
something more than the fleeting indications that people happen to be doing something 
together.  The main issue, Brown suggests, is that ‘the participants appear to be interacting in 
terms of their group memberships rather than their distinctive personal characteristics’.22  The 
process of interaction, exchange and mutual responsibility cements people into groups.   
The second key thing to say about social groups is that people in the groups must have 
some kind of relationship to other group members.  It is not enough to say that people have 
common characteristics, like gender or disability, or even a common identity - people often 
have many such identities.  Nor is it enough to say that each member has a relationship with 
the group as a whole - customers, or people who donate to a charity, have that much.  
Identifying someone as a member of a group indicates the existence of a relationship with 
other members – possibly a direct personal relationship, possibly a link through a network of 
other relationships.  The existence of a social group consists of network of relationships 
between people who participate in the group.  People who live, work or learn together 
generally have that kind of connection.  Saying that someone is a son or daughter, a pupil, a 
resident, a colleague or a citizen conveys both information about the relationship of that 
person to others, and usually some expectations about what people may do within the group.  
We can usually tell when we, or other people, are acting on behalf of an organisation - the 
situation is commonplace enough to hold few surprises.  The same could be said of other, 
more informal groups - visiting a family, joining a book club, attending a church - but the 
position there is more ambiguous: we might talk about them as a group but relate to the 
group’s members as individuals.   
 The family is a social group in these terms: families are defined by the members’ 
relationship to each other.  Family relationships take different forms in different societies: 
there are still societies with big, family-centred households on the Roman model, ruled by a 
paterfamilias, but legal structures that recognise that kind of arrangement are increasingly 
unusual.  Nuclear families are firmly established - there is everywhere a complex structure of 
law around them, including arrangements for recognition of the family, obligations relating to 
children, rules governing divorce and succession.  The relationships within families are 
varied and sometimes difficult to analyse; the rules governing family identification are often 
vague.  For example, there is no obvious or consistent rule about whether or not a 
grandparent has any say in a family, particularly in societies where divorce has become 
commonplace; and it is common in many societies for children to be passed between different 
                                                 
20 E Goffman, 1959, The presentation of self in everyday life, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
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21 E Goffman, 1971, Relations in public, New York: Basic Books. 
22 Brown, 2000, p 9.   
households or families when economic circumstances demand it.23 The central point, for the 
purpose of this argument, is that we recognise the reality of family structures despite the 
ambiguities - a family can be engaged with, supported, asked to make decisions, and so on.  
People might say that someone is spending time with the family, that the family is going on 
holiday, that the family is having a celebration, and so on.  These are not just figures of 
speech.  There are good reasons for treating everyone in the family as individuals as well as 
family members, but families are not just a collection of individuals.  The family is 
something real in our lives.  (It’s been observed that younger adults tend to deny this, at least 
until they start families of their own, or realise they have been landed with the responsibility 
for looking after an older relative.  ‘We are all individualists until we wake up.’24) Box 1.1 
discusses one of the key elements in family relationships, the duties of care that family 
members owe to each other, and duties relating to the previous generation.   
 
 
Box 1.1: The caring relationship  
People in a range of circumstances - old age, disability and illness among them - need 
personal care: such care may include help with personal hygiene, getting out of bed, dressing, 
cooking, cleaning, household management, and much else besides.  After the foundation of 
the welfare state, it was often supposed that the social services - organised personal services 
provided by local government or voluntary sector – were responsible for social care.   A 
landmark study of learning disability showed that the reality is very different: families carried 
the bulk of the responsibility, and hours of activity and engagement on a daily basis, and the 
services provided by statutory authorities offered only a limited supplement to the things that 
family carers were doing (for example, assistance with bathing - a ‘social bath’ - once a 
week.).25 Statutory services have had to learn to plan around the network of care that is 
provided by families, friends and neighbours.   
As increasing numbers of people have come to be served in their own homes, rather 
than in residential or long-stay nursing care, the relative emphasis on ‘informal’ care has 
grown.  Care in practice is based more on personal relationships than on formal organisations.  
Often the person who helps is a spouse; it may be a son or daughter, but because care is 
highly gendered, it is more likely to be a daughter, or even a daughter-in-law.  Within 
families, the responsibility is liable to fall on any adult who is at hand, but it is not confined 
to independent adults; much of the care given to older people is given by other older people, 
and in some families, young children have to act as the principal carers for chronically sick or 
disabled parents.   
 The caring relationship is not one-sided.  The basis of informal care is ‘reciprocal’, 
though the reciprocity can be highly generalised, and if returns are made, they are not usually 
made at the same time, or even to the same people, as the gift.  People look after older people 
because the older people once looked after them, because the older people looked after their 
own elders, and because they hope to be looked after by the next generation in their turn.  
(Pensions, too often dismissed by right-wing individualists as a confidence trick, are based on 
the same principle.) But there is direct reciprocity, too: studies of the caring relationship have 
emphasised what older people give to families, for example through finance, child care and 
emotional support.26  
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24 P G Wodehouse, 1918, Piccadilly Jim, London: Everyman Books, p 85. 
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26 H Qureshi, A Walker, 1989, The caring relationship: elderly people and their families, 
At first sight, the core of informal care is interpersonal; it has little to do with 
collectivism.  It may be one-sided (though it should not be assumed to be).  Nevertheless, 
informal care in families meets the criteria for being understood collectively: identity, 
relationships within the group and a capacity for collective action.  Its collective nature is 
reinforced when dealing with other collective organisations, such as health care, personal 
services and commercial providers.   
 
 
The third property of groups is a collective capacity for action.  The form of group action that 
is most easy to recognise is the action taken by organisations.  Collective organisations are 
pervasive.  If, in the course of the last few days, you have switched on any electric 
equipment, drunk water from a tap or a bottle, taken medicine, spoken on a telephone, studied 
for a course of education, heard the news or used the services of a bank, you have most 
probably experienced contact with a collective organisation, because it is only through 
collective organisations that most of these things are possible.  Some organisations are 
institutions, like schools and universities; they are part of the social framework.  Some are 
businesses.  There are businesses which are owned and run by one person, but while they are 
more numerous, they are not as prevalent as businesses of another kind - businesses that are 
corporate.  Examples are banks, electricity and gas suppliers, all the main supermarkets and 
clothing chains, and key internet suppliers such as Microsoft, Apple, Amazon or Google.  If 
your mailbox is anything like mine, a goodly proportion of any mail you will have received 
in the last month, either electronically or on paper, will have come from organisations - a firm 
selling goods, a university, local government, the tax authority.  Letters which appear to come 
from human beings have not necessarily been written by them, if they have been written on 
behalf of an organisation. We are so used to encountering and interacting with collective 
entities on these terms that we take what they do for granted.  Collective organisation is a fact 
of life. 
In the ‘new institutional economics’, organisations are treated as ‘groups of 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives.’27 List and Spiekermann, who 
are not otherwise unsympathetic to organisational perspectives, concede a great deal to 
reductive individualism: 
 
“Methodological individualists are right to remind us that the social world is 
ultimately the result of many individuals interacting with one another and that any 
theory that fails to accept this basic premise rests on mysterious metaphysical 
assumptions.”28 
 
It is not so.  Organisations are not just ‘the results of many individuals interacting with 
another’.  If we try to be reductive, to interpret the actions as the actions of the individuals 
who populate them - what Watkins calls a ‘rock-bottom’ explanation29 - we will fail, because 
organisations work to their own principles, rules and processes.  The National Trust, the 
Church of England, Barclays Bank and the Walt Disney Company all have an existence 
distinct from their founders or the people who populate them.  In formal legal terms, they are 
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27 D North, 1992, Institutions and economic theory, The American Economist 36(1) 3-6 
28 C List, K Spiekermann, 2013, Methodological individualism and holism in political 
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29 J Watkins, 1957, Historical explanation in the social sciences, British Journal for the 
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persons: they can make decisions, buy and sell things, employ people take action.  Many 
institutions of the type have no human owners - some businesses own themselves, others are 
owned by other corporations.  Most of the organisations we deal with are not like 
‘individuals’ at all.  There is nothing especially ‘mysterious’ or ‘metaphysical’ about the idea 
that groups and organisations exist, or that they have established ways of doing things.  Some 
of the arrangements we live with depend altogether on collective institutions and 
organisations, and while we can learn something about them from the conduct of individuals 
within them,30 many of our interactions with organisations (such as a contract, a 
communication, a transaction or a financial decision) are not intelligible in terms of the 
interaction of individuals.   In a world where routine interactions with and between 
organisations are increasingly moderated through standardised electronic communication, 
individuality does not always come into it.  
If groups have a recognised identity, and are bound together by a series of 
relationships, they can form relationships externally with other people, and with other groups.  
One business can own another; businesses can make contracts with governments.  A married 
couple can make a joint claim for benefits from a government agency.  A family can move 
house, a local community can arrange a ceilidh, a business can buy and sell goods, a country 
can go to war.  An industrial dispute is another instance of collective action: laws in the UK, 
which restrict the activities of trades unions, limit their authority collectively to call strikes, 
even though the individuals who have joined the unions still have the right individually to 
withdraw their labour.  Collective action in social policy is generally action by a social group, 
and collective action takes place within the framework of the group’s structure.   
Some of the literature on social policy takes a romanticised view of collective action; 
it offers stirring examples of people banding together to take control or form a movement.31 
The main subject matter of this book is much more pedestrian.  Social groups are part of our 
everyday life - the actions of businesses, communal organisations, schools, charities or 
government are examples.  To understand their role more clearly, we need to understand the 





How can a group take action? There is no collective mind; decisions must be taken in some 
way by the people who make it up.  There is a class of collective action that consists of the 
joint action of individuals, but which falls short of action by a group.  People can reasonably 
be said to behave collectively, Isaacs argues, when they share objectives - going for a walk, 
singing together, applauding, painting a house.32 She refers to a class of ‘goal-oriented’ 
collectives - people who share a goal and take action to do it.  French refers to ‘random’ 
collectives - people who happen to find themselves in the same place at the same time, a bus 
queue or a mob - and other ‘aggregate’ collectives, people who share some feature that 
happens to bring them together for common action.33 But collectives of this sort, in their 
                                                 
30 S Robbins, T Judge, ,2013, Organizational Behavior, Boston: Pearson 
31 e.g.  S Alinsky, 1989, Rules for radicals, New York: Random House; P Beresford, 2016, 
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32 T Isaacs, 2011, Moral responsibility in collective contexts, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p 25. 
33 P French, Collective and corporate responsibility, New York: Columbia University Press, 
pp 12-13. 
nature, are temporary and ephemeral; as they develop an identity and a structure of 
relationships, they develop the structure and the nature of a social group.  
It is easiest to recognise group action when it is formalised. Within organisations, 
there are usually established procedures by which decisions can be made and recognised.  
Every corporate organisation, French argues, has ‘rules of recognition’, which make it 
possible to distinguish which things have been decided by the corporation, and which have 
not.  The internal structure of decision making calls for a corporate structure, procedural 
rules, and policies.34 Formal decisions are typically made by committees or boards; there are 
often elaborate structures of authority, to ensure that no-one acts on behalf of the organisation 
without having clearly delegated authority to do so.  (Governments work in the same way - 
more of that later.)   The structures of authority can be subverted - Niskanen points to the 
problems of capture by a self-interested bureaucracy35 - but it cannot be assumed either an 
organisation is controlled by individuals, or even that continuing authority rests with human 
beings.  In some cases - for example, some religious foundations and charitable trusts, and 
arguably in the operation of the judiciary - the key decisions rest in policies made and 
decisions taken by people who are now dead.   
Organisations are complex, and sometimes, as with human beings, not all the 
decisions they come to are clear or explicit;36 but there are rules, and conventions, and it is 
usually possible to recognise when a group decision has been taken.  The situation has to be 
interpreted in its context; we recognise group decisions through the ‘normative import’ we 
attach to them.37 There are many types of corporate organisation.  Some are autocratic; some 
are bureaucratic; some are political fora, where issues have to be negotiated and bargained 
over; some are simply disorganised.  (I used to work in a university where financial  
incompetence and mismanagement had made it possible for a determined group of scientists 
surreptitiously to build one of the best departments in its field in the world: ‘The university 
did not realise that we were overspending by ten times.’38) Then there are organisations 
which bring together other organisations: consortia (where distinct organisations collaborate), 
confederations (where each sub-unit is self-determining, federations where decision-making 
is divided between upper and lower tiers) and multi-level governance.  Group action, List and 
Pettit suggest, is ‘performative’; decisions depend on the way that organisations are made up 
and what they do.39 
The role of individuals within these structures is limited and constrained. There is a 
literature on ‘organisational behaviour’ in management, dedicated to understanding the way 
that people behave in organisational settings;40 it draws attention to such issues as motivation, 
team work, and ethical conduct.  For the purposes of this book, the area of most direct interest 
is the collective framework, rather than interpersonal differences – the question of how 
collective action is even possible.   
Part of the answer to that question relates to social norms.  Most of us do not sit at 
work wondering minute by minute or hour by hour why we are there and what we are 
supposed to do.  We might well be distracted by our own concerns, but we do not preoccupy 
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ourselves exclusively with them - we could not do any work if we did.  The nature of the 
work is set in terms of the circumstances we are working in.  For a new employee, it can all 
be a little bewildering; after a little time, we do not even think about it.  Participating in an 
organisation depends on the process of socialisation: we learn what to do and how to behave, 
and what we learn becomes our habit and practice.  List and Spiekermann suggest that social 
constructs, such as employment, may supervene on individuals, shaping the circumstances in 
which those individuals operate.41  
Socialisation, however, is only a partial explanation.  The clue to much of what is 
happening in a firm rests in that innocent word, ‘employee’.  The work of employees within 
an organisation requires them to act as part of that organisation.  Employees do not do 
everything a human being might do - on the contrary, we expect people to fulfil the role they 
are supposed to fill, and it can be disturbing when they do things that are outside that role 
(such as propositioning colleagues, or demanding personal sweeteners to do their job).  When 
people work within an organisation, their activity is defined not by their individual human 
characteristics, but by their roles.  Whenever people work in an organisation, they occupy a 
role, sometimes several roles.  The work of a police officer, a social worker, an IT manager 
or a social security clerk is based in the roles they occupy.  To understand what the person is 
doing, we need to know about the role that person has, and within organisations that role is 
constructed from the perspective either of the organisation, or from some external 
organisation such as a professional body. In economics, there is a theoretical literature which 
tries to explain the ‘principal-agent’ problem, which includes the (apparent) conundrum of 
why the employees in a firm should ever do what that the firm wants them to do, rather than 
pursuing their own interests.42  This imagines there is a problem where there may be none.  
People act, for the most part, in line with the roles they occupy and the norms associated with 
them.  
The roles that people have in formal organisations tend to be rather more closely 
specified than those in informal groups: they depend in part on a defined range of tasks but 
also, crucially, on authorisation.  A person acting in such roles represents the organisation.  In 
the examples of group action given before - shopping, education, using services, buying 
commodities - any interaction with a person is with a person who occupies an organisational 
role.  This also says something important about how groups decide.  The members of boards, 
trusts, committees or charities, no less than employees, are identifiable, and act, in terms of 
their roles; they have the authority to act, a definable set of activities that can be undertaken 
in those roles, and very often a set of rules about when and how decisions can be authorised.  
Board members, judges, legislators or voluntary committees all have power to make 
decisions, but they have to do it in a prescribed way, or it has no effect.  People who work in 
occupational or professional roles may well be exercising their own judgment, but that does 
not mean that they are operating as individuals.  The choices, preferences, quirks and foibles 
of individuals are only directly relevant if they fall in the scope of those roles - managers, 
functionaries and officials who fail to recognise the distinction between personal and 
organisational decisions are legitimately open to criticism.   
Sociologists have interpreted the issue of ‘roles’ very broadly, typically in terms of 
norms and expectations of behaviour43 - possibly a 'performance'.44 Once it is accepted that 
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there is such a thing as a group, that the group has an identity and a capacity to act, the group 
can act to bring certain things about, usually by directing or authorising people who occupy 
specific roles to do what is required.  Box 1.2 focuses on ‘voluntary’ organisations, which 
develop to make it possible for people together to achieve a range of social objectives, 
usually without a conventional profit motive; the sector operates through an extensive and 
complex framework of rules, norms and expectations.  There are many other types of group 
activity.  An electricity company can send a bill to a consumer.  A church can distribute 
charity to people in the surrounding area.  A school can write to parents about the way their 
child is behaving.  These statements are sometimes picked apart by determined individualists, 
but they have a clear meaning; we experience, and recognise, such actions as the actions of a 
collective entity.   
 
 
Box 1.2: The voluntary sector 
 
The voluntary sector is sometimes called the ‘third sector’, to distinguish it from the state on 
one hand and commercial enterprise on the other.45 At other times, voluntary and other 
independent services are characterised in terms of ‘civil society’, as distinct from the state 
and the individual, or perhaps the state and the family.46 Lyons defines the third sector as 
consisting of private organisations 
 
‘1.  that are formed and sustained by groups of people (members) acting voluntarily 
and without seeking personal profit to provide benefits for themselves or others 
2.  that are democratically controlled and 
3.  where any material benefit gained by a member is proportionate to their use of an 
organisation.’47  
 
This is not always true; much of the third sector is not unpaid, some third sector organisations 
are there for mutual benefit, and many third sector groups are self-perpetuating oligarchies 
rather than democratically controlled bodies.  It is not clear, either, that the sector has to be 
non-profit making.  If the defining element of the third sector is that it does not take profits, 
then charity trading, co-operatives and community businesses are not part of the third sector. 
The difficulty of defining the sector is partly because of blurred boundaries - there are 
social enterprises that are set up as private companies, charities that operate in the public 
sector, private firms that take advantage of rules for social enterprise.  But is also a reflection 
of the diversity of the sector, which has been called ‘a loose and baggy monster’.48 The 
National Council of Voluntary Organisations reckons that there are more than 165,000 such 
organisations in the UK49 - that is about one organisation for every 400 people.  The four 
largest categories of organisation were social service providers, cultural and recreational 
organisations, religious bodies and grant-making foundations; together these account for 
about half the numbers of organisations.  Others are concerned with a wide-range of activities 
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- among them, education, housing, environment, law, playgroups and so on.   
When people form voluntary associations, they come together to achieve some kind 
of social or public end.  (Some associations are not, of course, actively formed by anyone 
who is alive currently: they may have been in existence for decades, even centuries.) For 
most of the last 400 years, the rules for charities in the UK required them to fit one of four 
categories: the relief of poverty, advancement of education, the advancement of religion, or 
benefit to the community.  Those rules precluded certain types of activity from being 
considered as charities - political associations, membership groups like sports clubs or 
campaigns - but many of those restrictions were lifted by reform of the law a little over ten 
years ago, and the primary test now is that there should be some public benefit.  (The change 
of focus has sometimes proved challenging for institutions previously approved for the 
advancement of religion or education.) 
The history of social policy in most countries does not begin with government, but 
with a range of voluntary, charitable and religious organisations, and regulation of how they 
do things goes a long way back.  It is 1200 years since the council of Aachen, when the 
Church expressed concern about the lax practices of independent charities, and decided it 
may need to intervene in order to guarantee standards.50 Seven hundred years later, during the 
Reformation, similar criticisms were being levied at the Church in its turn.51  That prompted 
either the formation of a new sort of religious organisation, or the intervention of civic 
authorities.  The nineteenth century was a period where independent, mutualist and 
solidaristic organisations proliferated.52 It was also a period during which a whole range of 
new states were established, Belgium, Germany and Italy amongst them, to be followed in 
the 20th century by Norway, Finland, Poland and many more.  Those governments started to 
think that they ought to have a role, too.  In historical terms, the modern state is a relatively 







The idea of a ‘society’ has been treated with some scepticism in economic and political 
theory.  Some individualists have argued that the term is empty,53 and conservatives suspect 
it is being used to smuggle in assumptions about the way people ought to behave.54 When 
people talk about ‘the individual versus society’, it seems to imply that the individual has 
some kind of immediate personal relationship to a conglomerate of Everyone Else.  ‘Holism’ 
is sometimes understood the same way.55  That is not helpful.  ‘Society’ has a much more 
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complex, and more definite, meaning.  To understand it, we need to understand about social 
networks. 
People live in a complex, inter-related set of groups and networks - families, 
neighbourhoods, communities, political communities among them.  The social networks that 
people participate in are based in interaction, but there is more to it than interaction alone, 
because interaction does not imply the persistence of relationships or the continuity of 
networks.  The word that is most often used in Europe for this sort of persistence is 
‘solidarity’. That term is commonly misunderstood in Britain, where it is assumed to be about 
sentiment and fellow-feeling.  The idea of solidarity is not about feelings, but about 
relationships, and more specifically about obligations.  In Catholic social teaching, it stands 
for the mutual obligations that each person has to others: it embraces the responsibility that 
family members have to each other, the obligations that people have in small groups and 
communities, and the broader obligations that people have to others.56 Solidarity implies a 
relationship based on interdependence, exchange or mutual obligation.  The position of an 
individual is not, then, set in opposition to a gigantic, anonymous aggregate thing called 
‘society’.  Every person is part of a series of networks of relationships - relationships of 
family, friendship, community, identity, and so on - expanding outwards gradually until the 
links are recognisably part of a wider society.  Those networks are shaped by, and shape, the 
pattern of relationships that make up the society; and social behaviour, in turn, is formed 
within the framework of those relationships. 
A society is more than a social group, but it can be understood in similar terms.  It has 
an identity, it has relationships between its members, and in so far as it shares space with a 
country, territory or state, it has the capacity for collective action.  It is possible to identify, in 
the broader picture, a range of inter-related networks that are definable at the level of a 
country or a nation. There are some elements that whole countries share, and which they do 
not necessarily share when borders are crossed: those elements include common 
arrangements for government, formal arrangements for finance and law, and the absence of 
barriers (such as travel or currency exchange) that may exist in relations with other countries.  
That does not mean either that there cannot be closer or more restricted relationships - a 
society is made up of them - or that a society defines the limits of such relationships.  There 
may well be other networks, both formal and informal, which go across national boundaries - 
relationships such as family, culture and trading relations.  
 This describes the framework in which social relationships are set, but the idea of a 
society refers to more than the framework.  The starting point for this chapter was a 
consideration of the ways in which people live with each other.  If society is understood as a 
group, it is a group of rather a special kind. A society sets the terms on which other groups 
are formed and relate to each other.  It is not just a set of relationships; it is also the process 
through which those relationships are expressed.  In some cases, social rules can be made 
explicitly and directly through a process of law and government.  In other cases, people 
interacting in groups or in personal relationships will express the things they are doing in 
social terms – for example, in attempts to bring up children or to enforce moral rules.  In 
others again, supervenience ‘emerges’– it is the product of many people doing inter-related 
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Collectivism: some initial reflections on policy 
 
It does not follow, because so much is done collectively, that we can only respond to people 
in collective terms.  If we want to deal with people as they are, however, we need to 
recognise that they do live in families, neighbourhoods and communities, and that they do 
have relationships with schools, businesses, public organisations and so on.  One of the basic 
tasks of developing a social policy is to determine the focus of policy - identifying who and 
what policies should be dealing with.58 Some policies are directed to individuals; some are 
directed towards categories of individuals, such as older people; but many are not.  The focus 
may well fall on families, households, groups, organisations, agencies, communities and 
regions.  Collectivism is implicit in the kind of focus that is adopted in different studies: 
policies relating to organisations, corporate businesses, charities, or governments must, in its 
very nature, accept to some degree the collective nature of the activity.   
There are evidently many policies which are formed in terms of a collective reality - 
the structure of international relations, national defence, constitutional law.  Stereotyping, 
prejudice and conflicts between ethnic groups and communities are often conceived in terms 
of group relations and can meaningfully be addressed at that level.59 Policies can be directed 
at collective units - families, schools, hospitals, neighbourhoods, communities, organisations 
and businesses - rather than individuals or categories of people (categories such as women, 
poorer people or older people).  Groups and organisations are central to the way things are 
done, socially, economically, politically and practically.  This is not about the distinction 
between public provision and private enterprise - private enterprise can be collective, too.  
There are systems where people could provide services individually or in groups.  There are 
places where water is sold in bottles, and others where it is routed from reservoirs through 
pipes.  There are individual systems of transport, and mass urban transit.  There are personal 
tutors for children, but most schools educate children in groups.  (The collective organisation 
of education is generally taken for granted in developed societies.  There are alternative 
models for ‘home schooling’ which allow for an individuated response, but they are the 
exception rather than the norm.) It is reasonable to debate which options are best, but it 
makes little sense to assume that individualised choices are always superior.  It all depends on 
what we want to achieve and what can be done in practice.   
Collective action by groups is part of the everyday interactions of ordinary lives.  It 
does not follow that policy must be arranged in terms of group action: policies might still be 
directed at individuals, or inanimate objects, or the climate, or anything else.  But it would be 
a strange set of policies that never did or said anything relating to social groups such as 
families, businesses, social institutions, schools and hospitals, towns, regions and so on.  On 
occasion, the assumptions of neo-liberal politics are expressed so strongly in individualist 
terms that their proponents seem to forget that there are collective options.  Discussions about 
taxation are taken be about personal taxation, although much income and wealth is corporate; 
policies to increase savings are assumed to be about people’s individual bank accounts, rather 
than savings and stockholding by firms (a key issue in macroeconomics); policies for obesity 
are liable to be diverted into discussions of diet, despite abundant evidence that both the 
causes and the consequences of obesity are social.  Part of the purpose of this book is to 
consider reasons for looking at policies in other terms.   
 
                                                 
58 See P Spicker, 2014, Social policy: theory and practice, Bristol, Policy Press, ch 4. 
59 Brown, 2000, ch 8. 
